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Hurricane Insurance Litigation: More Than Wind
Versus Water
Virginia Y Trainor*
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. So much has already been said of
these devastating events, leaving one to wonder whether there is
anything else to be said on the topic. Apparently, there is. Two
years after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, there is still a litany of
litigation, with many remaining questions to be answered by our
courts. This author predicts that the litigation will continue for
quite some time. One can only hope the rebuilding on Louisiana
and Mississippi's Gulf Coasts will be complete and its residents'
lives fully restored well before this time.
The focus of this article is to review the rulings that have come
down thus far on the property insurance issues related to these
events and the unique procedural problems that hopefully will
never again be seen. Many of the issues discussed in this article
are-outside of the context of the hurricane litigation-merely of
academic interest. As one of my esteemed partners has observed,
the lessons learned today about property insurance law are
reminiscent of those learned in security devices during and after
the Great Depression. The lessons learned are indeed important
and may clarify Louisiana property insurance law to a degree never
before envisioned.
In many ways, this article is merely meant to be a picture in
time of the current state of the law at the two year anniversary of
these events. The landscape changes on an almost daily basis,
causing some concern on the part of the author that this very article
may be outdated before it is published. But again, that is the
point-to see how far we have come-but also to see how very far
we have to go before these issues become but another topic for law
students on future bar exams.
Copyright 2008, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Phelps Dunbar, LLP.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
I. THE GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES
Almost immediately after August 29, 2005, insureds and
insurers alike faced certain obstacles concerning insurance claims.
Insurance agents could not be located, insurance policies were
destroyed, and residents and business owners could not even enter
their cities, much less have their homes and businesses inspected
by insurance adjusters. Thus, before the investigation of these
claims could even begin, there was often a long delay in simply
starting the process.
This unique situation led to certain acts by the Governor, the
Louisiana Department of Insurance ("LDOI"), the Louisiana
legislature, and our courts to try to relieve some of the pressure
related to these unprecedented circumstances.
A. The Governor Acts
By September 6, 2005, Governor Blanco issued Executive
Order KBB005-32, which suspended all deadlines applicable to
legal proceedings, including prescription and peremption, in all
Louisiana courts, administrative agencies, and boards until
September 25, 2005. With the onslaught of Hurricane Rita and the
continuing impact of Hurricane Katrina, the order was extended to
October 25, 2005 and then again to November 25, 2007.
The order applied statewide and to all litigation and allowed
attorneys and all involved in the legal field to focus on their
families and recovery from the events, without ramification for
failing to execute filings due during this time.
B. The Louisiana Department of Insurance ("LDOI")
Our Louisiana Legislature apparently had some forethought
that a catastrophic event might one day befall our state. For a
typical property loss, an insurer has fourteen days to initiate its
claims investigation upon notice of a claim.' However, in the
event of a catastrophic event, an insurer is given thirty days to
initiate its investigation. Although the term "catastrophic" is not
1. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:658 (2007).
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defined in the statute, one should be loathe to say that either of the
two hurricanes was not a catastrophic event. Of course, the thirty
days begins to run on the date of notice of an event from an
insured, and as stated before, just giving notice to the insurer to
start the process was an insurmountable task for some.
The LDOI took several steps during the days, weeks, and
months immediately following the hurricanes to aid insureds,
including:
0 Emergency Rules 15, 17, 19 and 20: All insurers were prohibited
from canceling policies for any reason, including non-payment of
a premium for certain impacted parishes and types of policies.
These provisions expired in late 2005 or early 2006, depending on
the parish.
* Emergency Rule 22: Mandated that insurers form a mediation
program to which insureds could voluntarily submit their
homeowner disputes for resolution. As of the time of this writing,
this rule is still in effect and in use and has been helpful in
resolving many hurricane claims.
0 Emergency Rule 23: Suspended the right of insurers to cancel
or fail to renew policies insuring residential or commercial
property with a hurricane claim until sixty days after repairs were
complete, except under certain limited circumstances, as when the
insured has failed to pay insurance premiums or committed fraud,
or where the insured has stated that he will not be rebuilding the
insured property. This provision expired December 31, 2006,
thereby allowing insurers to begin issuing notices of cancellation
and non-renewal beginning January 1, 2007.
* Directive 195: Extended the time for an insured to complete
repairs to recover certain supplemental payments withheld by
insurers until repairs are complete. This provision was revised
several times, ultimately granting insureds up to two years from
the date of the claim to complete repairs and obtain the
supplemental payments. In contrast, the standard time in the
typical property policy to recover these sums is 180 days (six
months).2 There is some debate as to whether "date of the claim"
refers to the date the claim arose or when it was reported.
2. The typical property policy allows for recovery of "actual cash value,"
or replacement cost less depreciation, until repairs are complete, after which the
2008]
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0 Directive 199: Requested insurers to voluntarily extend the
time to file suit on claims related to these events from one year
after the loss to two years after the loss. Most insurers voluntarily
complied with this request.
C. The Louisiana Legislature
The Louisiana legislature followed upon the LDOI's Directive
199 with a statutory enactment extending the time to file suit for
claims related to these events to two years and one day after the
loss.3 The constitutionality of this action was challenged in the
courts as was envisioned by the legislature.4 The Louisiana
Attorney General brought a declaratory judgment action at the
direction of the legislature against insurers seeking a ruling that the
extension was constitutional.5 Certain insurers challenged the
legislation on two main grounds: (1) that it violates the Contracts
Clauses of the Louisiana and U.S. Constitutions by impairing the
private contractual relationship between insurers and their
policyholders; and (2) that it violates the Supremacy Clause of the
depreciation may be recovered if allowed by the policy and if the supplemental
claim is timely made. The standard period for recovery of the depreciation is
180 days after the loss. ISO Forms HD 00 03 10 00; ISO CP 00 10 04 02.
3. 2006 La. Acts No. 802, § 2 provides uncodified legislation to establish
an additional, limited exception to the running of prescription to August 30,
2007 for Hurricane Katrina claims and September 25, 2007 for Hurricane Rita
claims. Interestingly, at the same time the Louisiana legislature extended the
time to file suit to August 30, 2007 for Hurricane Katrina and September 25,
2007 for Hurricane Rita, the legislature passed a somewhat related measure
stating that insureds could file claims with insurers (as opposed to suits) until
September 1, 2007 and October 1, 2007 respectively. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
22:658.3 (2007). Thus, claims that may not have been reported by the deadline
to file suit will have to be considered by the insurer, but the insured may have no
recourse to sue for benefits under the policy.
Without a doubt, some insureds will miss the two year deadline and will
seek to raise arguments such as contra non valentem. For a more thorough
discussion of this issue, see Benjamin West Janke, Revising Contra Non
Valentem in Light of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, 68 LA. L. REv. 497, 540-45
(2008).
4. State v. All Prop. & Cas. Ins. Carriers Authorized & Licensed to Do
Bus. in State, 937 So. 2d 313 (La. 2006).
5. Id. at 317.
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U.S. Constitution because it attempts to regulate flood insurance,
which is preempted by federal law, i.e., the National Flood
Insurance Program.
The matter proceeded to the Louisiana Supreme Court on an
expedited basis after the district court upheld the constitutionality
67of the statute. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed.7  The
insurers argued that the legislation could not apply retroactively to
prohibit insurers from pleading that claims filed after one year are
time barred. However, the supreme court concluded that because
the Louisiana insurance industry is "pervasively regulated" and
because the former minimum period to bring suit was already set
by Louisiana law, insurers had notice that a change was a legal
possibility.8 The supreme court further reasoned that because the
hurricanes created a statewide emergency and impacted hundreds
of thousands of Louisiana citizens, including forced evacuation
and displacement, the legislation had a significant and legitimate
public purpose in protecting the rights of those citizens and their
general welfare.
9
The supreme court likewise rejected the contention that the
legislation violated the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution
concluding that the section of the legislation, which included
"flood insurance polic[ies]" could be read to reference flood
insurance policies "other than those issued pursuant to the
federally-regulated insurance program."'
In addition to extending the prescriptive period, the legislature
amended one of Louisiana's statutory provisions for bad faith,
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 22:658, to increase the
penalties from 25% to 50% of "the amount to be found due from
the insurer" and, in the case of a partial tender, 50% of "the
difference between the amount paid or tendered and the amount
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 325.
9. Id. at 326.
10. In 2007, the Louisiana Legislature amended Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 22:629 to mandate that property insurance policies allow for a two year
period to file suit. 2007 La. Acts No. 43.
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found to be due"--and to allow the recovery of reasonable attorney
fees and costs.1"
Moreover, Louisiana Revised Statutes section 22:658.2 was
enacted to prohibit a property insurer from using a floodwater
mark on a covered structure or the fact that a structure is moved off
of its foundation, without consideration of other evidence, to
determine whether a loss is covered under a homeowner's
insurance policy. 12 Perhaps more importantly, the provision puts
the burden of proof on an insurer where "damage to immovable
property is covered, in whole or in part, under the terms of the
policy of insurance."' 3 A violation of section 22:658.2 expressly
allows an insured to recover damages under Louisiana Revised
Statutes section 22:1220.
These amendments to the bad faith statutes went into effect on
August 15, 2006, with no Legislative statement as to whether the
statutes were to be applied retroactively or prospectively, an issue
that would have to be later decided by the courts.14
D. The Rush to the Courthouse: August 29, 2006
Notwithstanding the Louisiana Supreme Court's action
upholding the legislative extension of prescription on August 25,
2006, and the voluntary agreement of the insurance industry to
extend the time to file suit, many insureds rushed to the courthouse
in advance of August 29, 2006 to file suit. Their rush was
certainly justified in a time of uncertainty; however, this grand
influx of litigation-"the Hurricane Litigation"-created a
bottleneck at the courts from which many are still trying to
recover. At the two year mark, suits were still being filed.
11. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:658 (2007).
12. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:658.2 (2007).
13. Id.
14. 2006 La. Acts No. 12, § 1.
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II. THE FIRST BATTLE: PROCEDURAL JOCKEYING
A. Removal
As is often the case in litigation, plaintiffs file suit in state court
and defendants remove, whenever possible, to federal court. The
same occurred in the Hurricane Litigation. In efforts to keep this
from happening, insureds' counsel often got creative, naming local
insurance agents and insurance adjusters as defendants, in attempts
to destroy diversity jurisdiction.
1. The Retail Agents
The claim against the retail agents was typically that to the
extent that the insureds did not have sufficient coverage, the
insurance agent was at fault in failing to obtain the coverage. The
insurance agents and the insurer defendants responded to the
motions to remand with the argument that the claims against the
insurance agents were time barred under Louisiana Revised
Statutes section 9:5606, which provides a one year prescriptive
period and a three year peremptive period to file suit. The
defendants argued in many cases that the peremptive period began
to run from the date the policy was first issued and did not begin
anew each time the policy was renewed. For the most part, the
federal judges agreed and concluded many claims against the
agents were time barred, resulting in a ruling as to fraudulent
joinder of these defendants and a finding of diversity jurisdiction. 15
2. The Adjusters
The claims against the adjusters typically centered around the
improper adjustment of the claims. The courts concluded that
these claims failed, finding the acts of the insurance adjuster were
16on behalf of and therefore the conduct of the insurer. Thus, like
15. Bates v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 06-10566 (E.D. La. July 11, 2007); La.
Med. Mgmt. Corp. v. Bankers Ins. Co., No. 06-7248 (E.D. La. Apr. 18, 2007).
16. Cajun Kitchen of Plaquemines, Inc. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., No. 06-8939
(E.D. La. Jan. 3, 2007); Rosinia v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. 06-6315 (E.D. La.
Oct. 31, 2006).
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the retail agents, many of these claims were dismissed and the
federal court maintained jurisdiction. 17
3. Jurisdiction
In several cases, insurer defendants asserted alternative theories
of jurisdiction, including the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367 ("CAFA") and the Multiparty, Multiforum, Trial
Jurisdiction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1369 and 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(1)(B)
("MMTJA").' 8
The federal courts have accepted coverage under CAFA, which
requires minimal diversity and an amount in controversy of
$5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs. 19 However, CAFA is
limited to class actions. 20 Thus, for those actions not filed as class
actions, insurers sought to establish jurisdiction under the MMTJA,
which requires only minimal diversity between adverse parties that
arises from a single accident, where at least seventy-five natural
persons have died in the accident "at a discrete location."
21
However, the MMTJA requires a federal court to abstain from
exercising jurisdiction if (1) a substantial majority of all plaintiffs
are citizens of a single state of which the primary defendants are
also citizens; and (2) the claims asserted will be governed
primarily by the laws of that state.22 Removal is allowed if (1) the
action could have originally been brought under the MMTJA; or
(2) the defendant is a party to an action which is or could have
been brought under the MMTJA and arises from the same
accident, even if the action to be removed could not have been
17. Cajun Kitchen, No. 06-8939; Rosinia, No. 06-6315.
18. Craddock v. Safeco Ins. Co., No. 05-6365 (E.D. La. Aug. 15, 2006);
Flint v. La. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., No. 06-2546 (E.D. La. Aug. 15, 2006).
For a thorough discussion of this issue, see Joshua A. DeCuir, A Federal Tate-b-
Tate? The Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act and Hurricane Katrina:
Past, Present, andFuture Considerations, 68 LA. L. REV. 681 (2008).
19. Craddock, No. 05-6365; Caruso v. Allstate Ins. Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d
364 (E.D. La. 2007); Gaunt v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., No. 06-7817 (E.D.
La. June 29, 2007).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1369(a) (2006).
22. § 1369(b).
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brought in a federal district court as an original matter.23 Judge
Polozola, without written reasons, concluded that jurisdiction
under the MMTJA existed in Chehardy v. State Farm Fire and
Casualty Co.24 The insurers further attempted to use this finding in
Chehardy in subsequent cases based on the piggy-back provision
in 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(1)(B).25 Outside of the levee breach
litigation, jurisdiction under the MMTJA was rejected and its use
in Chehardy as a basis of jurisdiction was called into question. 26
B. Class Actions
Many lawsuits were filed as class actions, including the state
court cases Oubre v. Louisiana Citizens Fair Plan27 and Buxton v.
Louisiana Citizens Fair Plan,28 and two federal suits-Caruso v.
Allstate Insurance Co.29 and Terrebonne v. Allstate Indemnity
Co. 30 The defendants in these actions objected to the class filings.
In Oubre, the fifth circuit upheld the class certification, finding that
all class certification requirements had been satisfied.31  In
contrast, the district courts in Buxton, Caruso and Terrebonne
declined to reach the same result.
32
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(1)(B) (2006).
24. Nos. 06-1672, 06-1673 (M.D. La. 2006). Chehardy was subsequently
transferred to the Eastern District of Louisiana and was consolidated into In re
Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., No. 05-4182 (E.D. La. Apr. 16, 2007),
aff'd in part, vacated in part, 495 F.3d 191 (5th Cir. 2007).
25. See Wallace v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Co., 444 F.3d 697, 702 (5th Cir.
2006) (stating that 144 1 (e)(1)(B) "established supplemental jurisdiction over the
Wallace action, piggy-backing jurisdiction on the district court's original
jurisdiction over the pending Chehardy action" but did not clearly determine
whether Katrina was an "accident" as envisioned by the statute).
26. Johnson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 06-6248 (E.D. La. Nov. 28,
2006); Flint v. La. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., No. 06-2546 (E.D. La. Aug. 15,
2006).
27. 961 So. 2d 504 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 964 So. 2d 363 (La.
2007).
28. No. 2006-8341 (Civ. Dist. Ct. Aug. 9, 2007).
29. No. 06-2613, slip op. at 4 (E.D. La. Aug. 3, 2007).
30. No. 06-4697 (E.D. La. July 31, 2007).
31. Oubre, 961 So. 2d at 510.
32. Buxton, No. 2006-8341; Caruso, No. 06-2613, slip op. at 4 (citing
Comer v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 1:05 Civ. 436, slip op. at 2 (S.D. Miss.
Feb. 23, 2006)); Terrebonne, No. 06-4697.
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III. THE SUBSTANTIVE RULINGS
When the wave finally subsided on the jurisdictional issues, the
parties naturally began to focus on the key substantive issues.
Three key substantive issues have thus far been considered in
Louisiana courts, all with differing results: (1) the application of
the water exclusion; (2) the application of Louisiana's Valued
Policy Law; and (3) the application of the new or old version to
Louisiana's statutes for bad faith penalties. Other important issues
have yet to be addressed, including business interruption insurance.
A. The Water Exclusion
Almost immediately after Hurricane Katrina, some began to
question whether property policies, which typically cover fire and
wind and exclude "water," covered water damage caused by a
hurricane event, particularly where flooding was arguably caused
by human fault.
Gladys Chehardy's suit against Louisiana Insurance
Commissioner Robert J. Wooley was one of the first suits filed on
the issue, having been filed in September of 2005. 33 In Chehardy,
a class of plaintiffs filed suit against most of the property insurers
in Louisiana, as well as then-insurance commissioner, Robert
Wooley. The plaintiffs claimed that the standard water exclusion
found in such property policies does not exclude water damage due
to flooding caused by breaches in the levee system that occurred
because of human negligence in design, construction, and
maintenance. In addition to these allegations, the class plaintiffs
sought a writ of mandamus to have Wooley similarly interpret
these provisions as suggested in the petition.
The Chehardy suit was by no means unique. Several other
petitions were filed on similar issues, including Vanderbrook. v.
Unitrin Preferred Insurance Co., Xavier University of Louisiana v.
Travelers Property Casualty Co. of America, and Humphreys v.
Encompass Indemnity Co., among others, which were consolidated
33. Chehardy v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., Nos. 06-1672, 06-1673 (M.D.
La. 2006).
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in the United States District Court in New Orleans as In re Katrina
Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation ("Katrina Breaches").34
In a much publicized opinion, Judge Stanwood Duval ruled
that many of the water exclusions found in all-risk policies are
ambiguous in the context of flooding due to human fault, thereby
rendering them unenforceable if such damages were ultimately
proven. In Katrina Breaches, the court considered motions for
judgment on the pleadings and motions to dismiss filed by several
insurers issuing homeowners' policies based on water exclusions
in the policies. The plaintiffs in each of the consolidated cases
alleged that the negligence of government entities responsible for
design, construction, and maintenance of levees and floodwalls
contributed to the breaches, resulting in the flooding of their
properties. The plaintiffs contend the water exclusions in the all-
risk policies are ambiguous because they do not specify whether
coverage is excluded for loss due to water caused by human
negligence or whether it applies only to naturally occurring
flooding.
The district court denied all but two of the insurers' motions to
dismiss. As to the two insurers against whom claims were
dismissed, one insurer's policy made clear that the water exclusion
applies to flood regardless of how it is caused, while the other
policy expressly excluded loss caused by failure of "levees."
36
Addressing the language of the other policies, the court started
from the principle that all-risk policies extend to all risks of
physical loss, except where expressly excluded.37 The court then
considered cases addressing exclusions for collapse and earth
movement and cases refusing to apply water exclusions to pipe and
water hydrant bursts, and held that for water damage due to
34. More than forty cases were consolidated for pretrial purposes in the
Eastern District of Louisiana. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig.,
466 F. Supp. 2d 729 (E.D. La. 2006), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 495 F.3d 191
(5th Cir. 2007). This article does not attempt to address the other issues
involved in the Katrina Breaches litigation, including the claims against the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers. See id.
35. Id. at 772. The court, however, upheld exclusions for damage "no
matter the cause." Id. at 775.
36. Id. at 763-64, 774.
37. Id. at 737.
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negligence to be excluded, such damage must be unambiguously
identified in the exclusion. 3 8 The opinion devotes much discussion
to the meaning of "flood," which is included in the definition of
"water damage" in most property policies, as opposed to the
broader definition of "water damage." 39 In considering the
meaning of "flood," the opinion notes that the policies do not
specifically define "flood" and that the term "flood" is susceptible
to two reasonable constructions: man-made floods and natural
floods. The court concluded that the term "flood" is ambiguous as
it is susceptible to different constructions and not reasonably
limited to natural occurrences, and that the ambiguity would be
construed against the insurers.40 The court certified its decision for
immediate appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. 4'
Judge Medley, in Historic Restoration, Inc. v. RSUI Indemnity
Co., went one step further. Judge Medley followed Duval's
reasoning and concluded the water exclusion was ambiguous;
however, he also ruled the flooding in New Orleans was caused by
human fault and thus was covered under the policy.
42
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit overturned Judge Duval's rulings
in the Katrina Breaches litigation that the provisions were
ambiguous.43 Specifically, the Fifth Circuit concluded:
In light of these definitions, we conclude that the flood
exclusions are unambiguous in the context of this case and
that what occurred here fits squarely within the generally
prevailing meaning of the term "flood." When a body of
water overflows its normal boundaries and inundates an
area of land that is normally dry, the event is a flood. This
is precisely what occurred in New Orleans in the aftermath
of Hurricane Katrina. Three watercourses-the 17th Street,
Industrial and London Avenue Canals--overflowed their
38. Id. at 756-60.
39. Id. at 747-56.
40. Id. at 757.
41. Id. at 780-81.
42. Historic Restoration, Inc. v. RSUI Indem. Co., No. 2006-4990 (Civ.
Dist. Ct. Dec. 5, 2006), aff'd, 955 So. 2d 200 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2007), writ
denied, 959 So. 2d 497 (La. 2007).
43. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 221 (5th Cir.
2007).
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normal channels, and the levees built alongside the canals
to hold back their floodwaters failed to do so. As a result,
an enormous volume of water inundated the city. In
common parlance, this event is known as a flood.
Even if we accept the plaintiffs' characterization of the
flood in this case as non-natural, we disagree that the term
"flood" in this context is limited to natural events. The
plaintiffs first maintain that dictionary definitions support
their interpretation, but the dictionaries we have reviewed
make no distinction between floods with natural causes and
those with. non-natural causes. Indeed, the Columbia
Encyclopedia specifically states that a flood may result
from the bursting of a levee. Similarly, Appleman's
treatise states: "A 'flood,' contemplated by the exclusion,
can result from either natural or artificial causes."
In sum, we conclude that the flood exclusions in the
plaintiffs' policies are unambiguous in the context of the
facts of this case. In the midst of a hurricane, three canals
running through the City of New Orleans overflowed their
normal boundaries. The flood-control measures, i.e.,
levees, that man had put in place to prevent the canal's
floodwaters from reaching the city failed. The result was
an enormous and devastating inundation of water into the
city, damaging the plaintiffs' property. This event was a
"flood" within that term's generally prevailing meaning as
used in common parlance, and our interpretation of the
exclusions ends there. The flood is unambiguously
excluded from coverage under the plaintiffs' all-risk
policies, and the district court's conclusion to the contrary
was erroneous.
44
44. Id. at 214-15, 221 (citations omitted). See also Axis Reinsurance Co. v.
Lanza, No. 05-6318, slip op. at 1, 3 (E.D. La. Mar. 29, 2007) (relying on the
district court Katrina Breaches opinion to hold that exclusion for "damage due
to... hurricane" in a policy providing coverage for damage to a watercraft does
not exclude coverage for a loss when the watercraft sank in water from a levee
failure, assuming the levee was negligently designed or maintained).
2008]
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Notwithstanding the Fifth Circuit ruling, at least one state
appellate court has cast doubt on the Fifth Circuit's interpretation
of this issue. In Sher v. Lafayette Insurance Co., the Louisiana
fourth circuit issued an opinion that can only be described as
confusing.45 At first glance, the ruling appears to follow the Duval
analysis (albeit without reference to it), finding the water exclusion
46
ambiguous in the context of man made negligence. However, a
closer reading of the ruling reveals only two of the judges
expressly signed off on this portion of the ruling, with one issuing
a formal dissent finding the water exclusion unambiguous and
fully enforceable.47
B. The Valued Policy Law
Prior to Hurricane Katrina, Louisiana's Valued Policy Law
("VPL"), found at Louisiana Revised Statutes section 22:695,
received little attention. Although there were certainly cases
interpreting it,48 the decisions concerning the VPL received little
fanfare. After Katrina and Rita, the VPL began to receive a lot of
attention due to attorneys' efforts to recover full policy limits for
their clients, even when only a portion of an insured loss was due
to a covered peril.
The allure of the VPL is that it provides for the full recovery of
the policy's limits in the event of a "total loss." Specifically, the
statute provides:
A. Under any fire insurance policy insuring inanimate,
immovable property in this state, if the insurer places a
valuation upon the covered property and uses such
valuation for purposes of determining the premium charge
to be made under the policy, in the case of total loss the
insurer shall compute and indemnify or compensate any
covered loss of, or damage to, such property which occurs
45. 2007-CA-0757, 2007 WL 4247708 (La. App. 4th Cir. Nov. 19, 2001).
46. Id. at *5.
47. Id. at *23 (Cannizzaro, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
48. Real Asset Mgmt., Inc. v. Lloyd's of London, 61 F.3d 1223, 1228 (5th
Cir. 1995); Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Wasserman, No. 97-1803, slip op. at 2 (E.D.
La. Nov. 17, 1997); Grice v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 359 So. 2d 1288 (La. 1978);
LaHaye v. Allstate Ins. Co., 570 So. 2d 460, 464 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990);
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during the term of the policy at such valuation without
deduction or offset, unless a different method is to be used
in the computation of loss, in which latter case, the policy,
and any application therefor, shall set forth in type of equal
size, the actual method of such loss computation by the
insurer. Coverage may be voided under said contract in the
event of criminal fault on the part of the insured or the
assigns of the insured.49
In Chauvin v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., the insured
plaintiffs filed suit against various insurers claiming that the VPL
mandates that insureds be allowed to recover the full policy limits
in the event of a total loss. 50 The insurer defendants responded
with a motion to dismiss in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana, asserting that (1) the VPL applies
only to a total loss resulting from fire; and (2) even if the VPL
extends to perils other than fire, the VPL does not allow full
recovery when the total loss is not caused by a covered peril. 51 In
response, the insureds argued that the VPL does apply to non-fire
perils and that the VPL requires an insurer to pay the agreed face
value when (1) the property is rendered a "total loss," even if the
"total loss" is due to an excluded peril; so long as (2) a covered
peril causes some damage, no matter how small, to the property.
Without deciding that the VPL applied to non-fire perils, the
district court first held that, regardless of whether the statutory
language of the VPL is considered ambiguous, the homeowners'
interpretation would lead to absurd consequences.
52
Judge Vance heard the motions and concluded that the focus of
the VPL was on establishing the value of the property in the event
of a total loss and was not intended to expand coverage to excluded
perils. Thus, the court determined that the VPL does not apply
when a total loss does not result from a covered peril. 53 Because
the court ruled the VPL was not triggered on this basis, the district
49. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:695 (2007) (emphasis added).
50. 450 F. Supp. 2d 660, 661-62 (E.D. La. 2006), aff'd, 495 F.3d 232 (5th
Cir. 2007).
51. Id. at 662.
52. Id. at 664, 666.
53. Id. at 667.
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court did not touch on the other issues. However, in a subsequent
ruling in another case, Judge Vance ruled that the VPL applies to
all policies that provide fire coverage and not "fire only" policies
and, more importantly, the VPL may apply to a loss under such a
multi-peril policy due to a peril other than fire, including wind.54
On August 6, 2007, the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court's
ruling in Chauvin on the application of the VPL.55 Specifically,
the Chauvin opinion issued by the Fifth Circuit states:
We agree with the district court that the language of the
VPL is not clear and unambiguous. In particular, the
critical language in the statute providing that "in the case of
a total loss the insurer shall compute and indemnify or
compensate any covered loss of, or damage to, such
property" is susceptible of two possible meanings: (1) in
the event of a total loss, an insurer is required to pay the
homeowner the agreed full value of a policy as long as a
covered loss causes some damage to the property, even if a
non-covered peril renders the property a total loss; or (2) an
insurer is only required to pay the homeowner the agreed
face value of a policy when the property is rendered a total
loss by a covered loss. We therefore must interpret the
statute in a manner that best conforms to the purpose of the
law.
In other words, according to the Louisiana courts, the
VPL was adopted for two main purposes: (1) to keep
insurers from writing insurance on property for more than it
was actually worth, collecting premiums based on that
overvaluation, and later arguing that the property was
worth less than the face value when the property was
destroyed; and (2) to discourage intentional destruction of
property by insureds when they are permitted to over insure
their property.
54. Turk v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., No. 06-144 (W.D. La. June 7,
2006).
55. Chauvin v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 495 F.3d 232, 238 (5th Cir.
2007). The insureds requested that the issue be certified to the Louisiana
Supreme Court, a request the Fifth Circuit denied. Id. at 237.
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After considering the purposes of the VPL, we are
convinced that the insurers' construction of the VPL best
conforms with its legislative purpose and thus, the VPL
only requires an insurer to pay the agreed face value of the
insured property if the property is rendered a total loss from
a covered peril.
As the district court observed, the homeowners'
interpretation does nothing to further the purpose of the
VPL. In particular, a finding that the statute requires
insurers to pay the agreed face value of the property, even
if an excluded peril (flooding) causes the total loss, runs
counter to the VPL's effort to link insurance recoveries to
premiums paid. Such an interpretation of the statute would
force the insurer to pay for damage resulting from a non-
covered peril for which it did not charge a premium. Also,
because the focus of the VPL is on valuation (to set the
amount payable when there is a total loss), not on coverage,
the statute signals no intent to expand coverage to excluded
perils.
56
The results in the state court system are yet fully unknown. At
the district court level, the state courts that have considered the
issue have uniformly rejected the federal analysis.57 However, the
Louisiana third circuit has ruled in a 3-2 opinion in favor of the
defendant insurance companies, generally following the Fifth
Circuit's analysis in Chauvin.58  The third circuit in Landry v.
Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corp., distinguished its
reasoning, concluding that an insured may recover the policy limits
in the event a covered peril causes the property to be a "total
loss," 59 regardless of whether other causes, like flood, contribute to
56. Id. at 238-40 (footnotes omitted).
57. Landry v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., No. 85571-D (15th Jud. Dist.
Ct. Jan. 4), rev'd in part, 964 So. 2d 463 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2007); Langston v.
La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., No. 53-219 (25th Jud. Dist. Ct., Div. B Feb. 9,
2007).
58. Landry v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 964 So. 2d 463, 473 (La. App.
3d Cir. 2007).
59. Under Louisiana law, a constructive total loss occurs when the cost to
repair the property exceeds the property's value. Real Asset Mgmt., Inc. v.
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the loss, thereby adopting the "efficient proximate cause" approach
to causation. 60 In other words, the third circuit takes the view that
the flood damage should be excluded entirely from the analysis,
with the loss due to wind considered a total loss and implicating
the VPL only when the wind damage alone results in damage that
exceeds the value of the insured property. A similar appeal is
pending at the fourth circuit.
6 1
Several issues related to the VPL have not yet been addressed,
including the impact of flood payments when the VPL is triggered
and the issues surrounding the insurers' attempts to opt out of the
VPL. Were the current rulings to stand, these issues may never be
determined in the courts, at least not in the context of the
Hurricane Litigation, inasmuch as the overwhelming majority of
alleged VPL cases would not, in fact, trigger the VPL at all if its
application were determined solely on the basis of wind damage.
C. Business Interruption Insurance
The loss of business associated with Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita is comparable to that related to the events of 9/11, which led
to a flurry of litigation and a fairly well defined body of law on the
issues related to business interruption insurance, i.e., insurance for
business enterprises that protects from loss of income due to
damage caused by covered events. 62 On its most basic level, the
Lloyd's of London, 61 F.3d 1223, 1229 (5th Cir. 1995); Dumond v. Mobile Ins.
Co., 309 So. 2d 776, 778 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
60. Landry, 964 So. 2d at 479.
61. Historic Restoration, Inc. v. RSUI Indem. Co., 955 So. 2d 200 (La. App.
4th Cir.), writ denied, 959 So. 2d 497 (La. 2007).
62. See Duane Reed, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 411 F.3d 384
(2d Cir. 2005); Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. ABM Indus., Inc., 397 F.3d 158 (2d Cir.
2005); Pentair, Inc. v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 400 F.3d 613 (8th Cir.
2005); Lava Trading, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 365 F. Supp. 2d 434, 440
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that a lessee of property may recover for loss of
business income only for that period of time it would take to secure alternative
property where it had no control over the repairs to the property); Streamline
Capital, LLC v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., No. 02 Civ. 8123 (NRB), slip op. at 8
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2003) (holding that the period of restoration cannot be tied
to the rebuilding of property over which neither the insured nor the insurer have
any control).
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key legal issues for such coverage are typically: (1) whether the
coverage is triggered by a covered event; and (2) the period of
recovery for such coverage.
However, unlike the 9/11 litigation, we have not yet seen a
body of law develop in Louisiana. To date, there are only a few
decisions, all of which pre-date August 29, 2005, related to this
issue. And while the 9/11 litigation is helpful with respect to the
issues here, Louisiana, and New Orleans in particular, has the
complicating factor of loss of income due to multiple causes,
including flood, wind, mandatory evacuation, loss of resident base,
loss of market, and loss of utilities.
In Urrate v. Argonaut Great Central Insurance Co., the
Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit determined that an
insurer owed a certain percentage of a business loss claim where
the insured's business was damaged by wind and water.63  The
property insurer's adjuster determined that most of the damage was
caused by flood, but that the property also suffered wind damage.
64
The policy provided property and business loss coverage. The
fifth circuit affirmed, noting that a large part of the back of the
building was gone including the window wall; other windows were
broken; and the roof was damaged and partly blown back over
itself by wind force.65 The appellate court noted that although it
might not have been the factual finding it would have made, it
could not say that based on the record the finding was clearly
wrong or manifestly erroneous. 66  It is unclear how the court
determined what percentage of business loss was caused by wind.67
63. 881 So. 2d 787, 791 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2004); see also Levitz Furniture
Corp. v. Houston Cas. Co., No. 96-1790, slip op. at 3 (E.D. La. Apr. 28, 1997)
(insured entitled to recover projected profits based on increased consumer
demand following flood from which the insured would have been able to benefit
had it been open for business).
64. 881 So. 2d at 789.
65. Id. at 790-91.
66. Id. at 791.
67. See also Simkins Indus., Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 401 A.2d 181, 191
(Md. App. 1979) (where uncovered flood and covered ensuing accident both
could have contributed to business interruption of insured plant, the jury was
entitled to consider the extent of the business loss caused by the covered
accident); cf St. Joseph Light & Power Co. v. Zurich Ins., 698 F.2d 1351, 1358
(8th Cir. 1983) (insured incurred extra expense due to fire (covered) and low-
2008] 407
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
In CII Carbon, L.L.C. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co.,
the fourth circuit considered a business income claim of its insured
who relied on the Kaiser aluminum plant to purchase its product.
68
In CII Carbon, the insured had contingent business income
coverage, i.e., coverage for damage to businesses upon which its
operations relied. 69  The insured unquestionably relied on the
Kaiser plant to purchase its product. The Kaiser plant had an
explosion and the period necessary to rebuild it was lengthy. The
insurer sought to limit the period of restoration to the period before
the insured could begin obtaining its product from another source.
The court disagreed, ruling the period of restoration for the
contingent business income claim was the length of time it would
take to re-build the Kaiser plant. Notably, this decision is contrary
to that found in the 9/11 litigation. 0
D. The Off-Set Cases and the Louisiana Road Home
Many insureds suing their property insurers were also insured
under flood policies. With New Orleans receiving wind and flood
damage, many of these insureds recovered under multiple policies,
raising the issue of duplicative payments. In the federal system,
the district courts have declined to allow an insured to recover
duplicative damages; however, they have not prevented an insured
who recovered under a flood policy from also recovering under a
water overheating condition of a boiler (not covered); court limited insured's
extra expense coverage to those amounts "solely" attributable to covered
damage).
68. 918 So. 2d 1060, 1062 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2005), writ denied, 925 So. 2d
1235 (La. 2006). Cf Duane Read, 411 F.3d at 398 (involving a BI claim arising
out of 9/11, in which the court followed a very narrow construction of period of
recovery for loss of the WTC site, limiting the period of recovery to that in
which the insured could obtain an alternate site reasonably equivalent of the
former WTC site); Lava Trading, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 442 (following Duane
Read to limit the BI claim to that period in which the insured could move into a
replacement office).
69. 918 So. 2d 1060.
70. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. ABM Indus., Inc., No. 01 Civ. 11200 (JSR), slip
op. at 3 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2006).
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wind policy.7' Rather the recovery under both policies has been
limited to the pre-storm value of the insured property.
As part of the recovery effort, the State of Louisiana developed
and implemented The Road Home Program. The Attorney
General's office alleges the Road Home Program was developed to
provide funding to assist recipients in offsetting their uninsured
losses and foster their efforts to rebuild their residences, lives, and
the communities where they live.72 The State Attorney General
has filed suit against the insurance industry to recover sums
allegedly owed to insureds via subrogation agreements with the
insureds, executed as a condition of recovery under the Program.
73
In other words, the State is seeking to recoup the funds paid out
through The Road Home Program. The State seeks recovery under
the policy terms, including seeking to nullify the water exclusion,
under the VPL, and for statutory bad faith penalties.
74
E. The Bad Faith Verdicts
The most plentiful verdicts have come in the bad faith arena.
The juries and judges hearing these cases-in state and federal
court-are almost all punishing the insurance industry.
71. Broussard v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 06-8084, slip op. at 4
(E.D. La. Aug. 2, 2007) (holding that insured is limited to the uncompensated
loss up to the homeowner policy limits); Ferguson v. State Farm Ins. Co., No.
06-3936, slip op. at 3 (E.D. La. May 9, 2007) (holding that insured not estopped
from recovering against flood and wind carrier but loss will be reduced by the
amount of the flood payments, with the maximum recovery under both policies
being the pre-storm value of the property); Esposito v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 06-
1837, slip op. at 2 (E.D. La. Apr. 16, 2007); Weiss v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 06-
3774, slip op. at 3 (E.D. La. Mar. 21, 2007) (holding that no policy provision
prevents plaintiffs from recovering for previously uncompensated, covered
damage, without reference to the amount received under their flood policy, so
long as the combined recovery does not exceed the value of their property).
72. State v. AAA Ins. Co., No. 2007-08970 (Civ. Dist. Ct. filed Aug. 23,
2007).
73. Id.
74. Id.
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1. The Language of the Statutes
There are two key statutes, Louisiana Revised Statutes sections
22:658 and 22:1220. The key provisions of the old version of
section 22:658 are:
B. (1) Failure to make such payment within thirty days
after receipt of such satisfactory written proofs and demand
therefor . . . when such failure is found to be arbitrary,
capricious, or without probable cause, shall subject the
insurer to a penalty, in addition to the amount of the loss, of
twenty-five percent damages on the amount found to be
due from the insurer to the insured, or one thousand dollars,
whichever is greater, payable to the insured . . . or in the
event of a partial payment or tender has been made, twenty-
five percent of the difference between the amount paid or
tendered and the amount found to be due.
75
The current version of R.S. 22:658 is identical to the old
version, with the exception that 25% is changed to 50% and
"reasonable attorneys fees and costs" are now recoverable.
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 22:1220 has not been amended,
with the exception that it now allows recovery for failure to abide
by section 22:658.2. The key provisions of section 1220 are:
C. In addition to any general or special damages to which a
claimant is entitled for breach of the imposed duty, the
claimant may be awarded penalties assessed against the
insurer in an amount not to exceed two times the damages
76sustained or five thousand dollars, whichever is greater....
2. The Issue of Retroactivity
Several judges have had occasion to consider the issue of
retroactivity of the amended versions of these provisions. The
federal judges have universally concluded that the old version of
the statute applies so long as the cause of action arose before
75. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:658 (2007) (amended by 2006 La. Acts No.
813, § 1).
76. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1220 (2007).
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August 15, 2006.77 In the state court system, one trial judge has
allowed the recovery under the new version of the statute, where
suit was filed after August 15, 2006, even though the alleged
breach occurred before the effective date.78 This portion of the
ruling, however, was reversed on appeal at the Louisiana fourth
circuit, thereby following the rationale of the federal district courts
that the version of the statute applies when the cause of action
accrues. 79 The state district court opinions are not reported, but it
is rumored that many district judges in Orleans Parish have
followed the new version of section 658. In Best v. State Farm
Fire and Casualty Co., the fourth circuit agreed with the federal
district courts that the old version applies where the claim for bad
faith arose before the effective date of the amendments, leaving
open the possibility of application of the new version where the
claim does not arise until after August 15, 2006. 80 However, the
continued failure to pay after this date is not enough to trigger the
new version.
Nevertheless, where the cause of action does not accrue until
after August 15, 2006, the insured may recover under the new
version of the statute as interpreted by some at the district court
level.81 Thus, at least as interpreted by the federal district courts,
whether the new or old version of 658 applies depends largely on
whether the insured characterizes the claim as having arisen before
or after August 15, 2006.
77. Broussard v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 06-8084, slip op. at 7-8
(E.D. La. Aug. 2, 2007); Cazeau v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 06-3802, slip op. at 2
(E.D. La. July 26, 2007); Leali v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, No.
06-5030 (E.D. La. July 3, 2007); Weiss v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 06-3774, slip
op. at 2 (E.D. La. Mar. 21, 2007); cf Gore v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., No. 06-
cv-2054, slip op. at 3 (W.D. La. June 6, 2007) (for purposes of a motion to
remand, the judge assumed the new version of the statute applied in determining
whether the amount in controversy was satisfied).
78. Sher v. Lafayette Ins. Co., No. 2006-9276 (Civ. Dist. Ct. Mar. 26,
2007).
79. Sher v. Lafayette Ins. Co., No. 2007-CA-0757, 2007 WL 4247708 (La.
App. 4th Cir. Nov. 19, 2001).
80. No. 2007-0573, 2007 WL 3015571 (La. App. 4th Cir. Oct. 10, 2007).
81. Conlee v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., No. 07-660, slip op. at 3 (E.D. La.
July 17, 2007) (new version applied where no payment was made before
effective date of amendments).
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3. The Damages Awarded Under the Statutes
In Weiss v. Allstate Insurance Co., the jury awarded a
substantial amount of damages for mental anguish to insured
homeowners under Louisiana Revised Statutes section 22:1220.82
In Tomlinson v. Allstate Indemnity Co., the insurer moved for
partial summary judgment on certain of the insured's claims,
including the insured's assertion of a claim for pain and suffering
and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 83 Judge Feldman
dismissed these claims, noting that the insured preserved a claim
under section 22:1220.84 Judge Feldman did not make a statement
as to whether damages for mental anguish could be awarded under
this provision.
In Shadow Lake Management Co. v. Landmark American
Insurance Co., a federal judge held that statutory bad faith
penalties for an untimely response to a first-party claim apply to
the entire amount ultimately found due under the policy even
though the payments triggering bad faith were for payment of only
undisputed amounts. 85 The insured sued its insurer alleging that
the insurer was aware that there was an undisputed portion of the
claim owed yet failed to pay the claim within the statutory
deadlines. 86 The insured sought summary judgment that this late
payment was, as a matter of law, statutory bad faith entitling the
insured to penalties. 87 The district court held that the failure to pay
the claim within the statutory deadlines would be considered bad
faith without evidence of arbitrary and capricious conduct,
exposing the insurer to penalties based on the undisputed sum.
88
However, a fact issue remained as to the time the insurer was
obligated to pay on the loss, and the court concluded it must deny
the insured's motion.89 The court went on to hold, however, that if
82. No. 06-3774, slip op. at 8. See also Dickerson v. Lexington Ins. Co.,
No. 06-8056 (E.D. La. Sept. 7, 2007).
83. No. 06-0617, slip op. at 1 (E.D. La. Jan. 31, 2007).
84. Id. at 2.
85. Nos. 06-4357, 06-4358, 06-4359, 06-4360, 06-4428, slip op. at 5 (E.D.
La. July 2, 2007).
86. Id. at 1.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 3-4.
89. Id. at 5.
[Vol. 68
HURRICANE INSURANCE LITIGATION
the insurer were found in bad faith for failure to timely pay the
undisputed sums and was also ultimately found liable for
additional sums under the policy beyond the undisputed amount,
the insurer would be liable for penalties on that additional amount
as well regardless of whether there were evidence of bad faith as to
that additional amount.90 Recovery under 1220 was limited to
100% of the entire claim.
9 1
IV. A COMPARISON TO MISSISSIPPI
Mississippi has not seen the amount of litigation found in
Louisiana. However, a comparison of the rulings is interesting.
The key rulings thus far in Mississippi have been: (1) the water
exclusion is unambiguous and enforceable; 92 (2) the anti-
concurrent causation wording is unambiguous and enforceable in
certain situations in the context of Hurricane Katrina claims; 93 and
(3) the insured's recovery may be limited by payments received
from other insurers.
94
In Leonard v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., the insureds
had purchased a homeowner's policy through a local agent of the
insurer's.95 The policy provided coverage for damage caused by
windstorm but excluded coverage for damage caused by water,
defined to include: "flood, surface water, waves, tidal waves,
overflow of a body of water, and spray from any of these, whether
driven by wind or not., 96 The insureds' home sustained wind
damage, and was also inundated by storm surge to the depth of
approximately five feet.9 7  The insureds did not have flood
insurance. Following an inspection of the insureds' property, the
insurer made an estimate of the wind damage and tendered
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 684, 695 (S.D.
Miss. 2006), aff'd, 499 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 2007).
93. Tuepker v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 06-61075, 2007 WL
3256829 (5th Cir. Nov. 6, 2007).
94. Tejedor v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. CIVAl:05CV679LTS-
RHW, slip op. (S.D. Miss. Nov. 6, 2006).
95. 438 F. Supp. 2d at 687.
96. Id. at 689.
97. Id.
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payment to the insureds.98 The insureds asserted that all of the
damage resulting from the hurricane was covered under the policy
on the basis that the insurer's agent had informed them that
purchasing flood insurance was not necessary. The court held that
the provisions of the policy excluding coverage for damage caused
by water are valid and enforceable, stating "[t]o the extent property
is damaged by wind, and is thereafter also damaged by water, the
insured can recover that portion of the loss which he can prove to
have been caused by the wind, but the insurer is not responsible for
any additional loss it can prove to have been later caused by
water." 99 While noting that the insurer was not relying upon the
anti-concurrent causation language contained in a "weather
conditions" exclusion to deny coverage, the court also noted that to
the extent the anti-concurrent causation wording would bar
coverage for windstorm damage (a covered loss) when that
damage "occurred at approximately the same time" as an excluded
peril, e.g., water, then such wording is ambiguous and not
enforceable under Mississippi law. 00 The court's comment is
consistent with other post-Katrina rulings in which it criticizes
reliance on the anti-concurrent causation wording in the defense of
a hurricane claim.
The court then addressed the insureds' claim that the policy
afforded coverage for all damage that resulted from the hurricane
(wind and water) based on the representations of the insurer's
agent. The court found that, based on the evidence presented at
trial, it was apparent that the insureds had asked the agent whether
it would be advisable to purchase flood insurance and that the
agent offered his opinion that it was not necessary. 1 1 The court
found that the agent did not materially misrepresent the terms of
the policy and that he did not make any statement which could be
reasonably understood to alter the terms of the policy. To the
extent that the insured may have inferred that the policy would
afford coverage for water damage, the court found that such an
98. Id. at 689-90.
99. Id. at 695.
100. Id. at 694.
101. Id. at 690.
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inference was "erroneous" and "inconsistent with the policy
exclusion for water damage."'
0 2
In Tuepker v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., the Fifth
Circuit reversed a ruling from the Southern District of Mississippi
that anti-concurrent language is ambiguous and unenforceable in
the context of hurricane claims.'°3 At the district court level, Judge
Senter denied a motion to dismiss filed by State Farm based on the
anti-concurrent language contained in the policy. In its order on
that motion, the district court ruled favorably for State Farm that
the flood exclusion in its policy applied to damage caused by storm
surge but ruled that the State Farm policy's anti-concurrent
causation clause was ambiguous and did not apply to bar coverage
for the insured's claim. 1
04
The Fifth Circuit, consistent with the Leonard v. Nationwide0 5
decision, first maintained the enforceability of the flood exclusion,
noting the exclusion is clear and unambiguous and, further, that it
applies to damage caused by storm surge. The Fifth Circuit
reversed the finding of the district court that the anti-concurrent
causation language is ambiguous. Specifically, the court stated,
"any damage caused exclusively by a nonexcluded peril or event
such as wind, not concurrently or sequentially with water damage,
is covered by the policy, while all damage caused by water or by
wind acting concurrently or sequentially with water, is
excluded." 10  The court thus found that "the ACC Clause in
combination with the Water Damage Exclusion clearly provides
that indivisible damage caused by both excluded perils and
covered perils or other causes is not covered."'' 0 7 The impact of
the ruling is not as clear cut as this language would indicate,
however, because the court then stated the ACC Clause applies
only to "any loss which would not have occurred in the absence of
one or more of the following excluded events." 10 8 This language,
the court found, would not bar coverage for a loss to a roof blown
102. Id. at 692.
103. No. 06-61075, 2007 WL 3256829 (5th Cir. Nov. 6, 2007).
104. Id. at *2.
105. 438 F. Supp. 2d at 687.
106. Tuepker, 2007 WL 3256829, at *6.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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off by wind where subsequent storm surge later completely
destroys the structure because the roof damage, when it occurred,
occurred in the absence of any listed excluded peril. In so ruling,
the Fifth Circuit confirmed that the application of the ACC clause
is not an undue derogation of Mississippi's common law efficient
proximate cause rule.
In Tejedor v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., the court ruled
that the insured could not recover twice for the same damage from
multiple insurers. 1° 9 The homeowner sued its windstorm insurer,
which sought dismissal of the claim for extra-contractual and
punitive damages. The court reserved ruling on the motion, but
stated that it would use the occasion to rule that the actual loss is
the maximum recovery from all applicable policies." 0 The court
noted that it is a basic proposition that "'[i]nsurance law is based
on the principle of indemnification and is aimed at reimbursement.
The benefit derived from insurance should be no greater in value
than the loss.' These well-established principles of indemnity and
insurable interests apply to all insurance claims under policies that
are not 'valued policies.'"II
The property was appraised at a pre-loss value between
$280,000 to $285,000.112 The homeowner collected $200,000
from its flood insurer."1 3 Thus, the court ruled that "his maximum
loss is measured by the difference between the pre-storm value and
the insurance benefits he has collected to compensate him for the
loss of his dwelling, i.e., $80,000-85,000."' 14 The court also held
that the same principles would apply to a claim for payment on
personal property. 115
V. CONCLUSIONS
As is evident, there have been a substantial number of rulings
on the insurance issues thus far, and more are to be expected. In
109. No. CIVA1:05CV679LTS-RHW, slip op. (S.D. Miss. Nov. 6, 2006).
110. Id. at2.
111. Id. (quoting Estate of Murrell v. Quin, 454 So. 2d 437, 444 (Miss. 1984)
(Prather, J., dissenting)).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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two years, our courts have accomplished quite a bit, and their
progress will hopefully allow insureds and insurers alike to resolve
remaining claims within the bounds of these rulings.
It became evident while writing this article that it is virtually
impossible to cover every issue litigated thus far. However, the
author hopes to have achieved the goal of outlining the key issues
involved and the results obtained at year end 2007.

